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5 Findings 
l Introduction 
Switzerland lies in the heart of Europe-or rather continental Europe-
not only geographically, but also with regard to its legal traditions and insti-
tutions. The Swiss legal system is heavily influenced by French heritage rooted 
in Napoleon's reforms in criminal procedure, which have been absorbed by 
the francophone districts of Switzerland and all over Europe, as opposed to 
the more German-oriented features that have prevailed in the German-speaking 
parts of Switzerland.1 The Swiss Confederation, which is composed of 26 can-
tons, is inhabited by people who strongly identify with the local level of gov-
ernment. lt is well known for its adherence to direct democracy, including the 
political right to popular initiative, which allows the people to request the com-
plete or partial revision of the Federal Constitution. 
The Swiss criminal justice system reflects these features in various ways. 
Quite a few elements of Swiss criminal law have been introduced or reforms 
triggered by way of'popular initiative' (Volksinitiative); many aspects of crim-
inal procedure do indeed cater to local needs and ambitions. This reality is 
most clearly illustrated by the fact that, until three years ago, Switzerland had 
26 different criminal procedure codes ( some drafted in French, some in Ger-
man, some bilingual, and a few in Italian-depending on the official lan-
guage(s) of the respective canton), as well as three federal codes. One must 
keep in mind that the size of the Swiss territory is only 15,940 square miles, or 
41,285 square kilometres, and has approximately eight million inhabitants. 
The co-existence of so many different criminal procedure codes required a 
high degree of tolerance in the Swiss crirninal justice system -when enacting 
the rules, the legislature would leave room for discretion and often avoided 
rigid rule setting. In the past, the competent authorities thus often had dis-
cretion in how to handle certain aspects of criminal proceedings. However, 
when the harmonised Swiss Criminal Procedure Code [ CPC] entered into force 
in January 2011,2 criminal proceedings-including the gathering and use of 
1. Hauser & Schweri 1997, p. 9-12. 
2. Swiss Criminal Procedure Code of 5 October 2007 [CPC], SR 312.0, available at 
<http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/3/312.0.en.pdf> (lastvisited 8 Sept. 2014). The lapse oftime 
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evidence, and related exclusionary rules-became heavily regulated. The lack 
of rule-setting by the legislature is surprising since exclusionary rules must ul-
timately reflect an appropriate balance between the various interests involved 
in a given situation;3 these rules are also of high practical relevance because 
they may exclude crucial evidence and lead to a person's acquittal, which may 
be the only appropriate approach in cases where the evidence must be disre-
garded as unreliable. The rules in the CPC reflect a 'one size fits all' approach 
built on strict rules intended to govern fact-finding, but as the old saying goes: 
Water always finds its way. 
Taking into account the evolution of exclusionary rules, both in Switzer-
land and globally,4 we start with the hypothesis that it is very difficult or even 
impossible to establish a rigid legal framework for exclusionary rules, one 
which will not be diluted in one way or the other by the police, the courts, or 
the legislature itself. This is especially true when the criminal law tradition 
lends itself to rather pragmatic solutions, as was the case in Switzerland and 
maybe still is. We will thereby keep the overarching question of the conference 
topic in mind: How do the peculiarities of adversarial or inquisitorial crimi-
nal law systems influence the concept of exclusionary rules? What role does 
discretion play as regards the exclusion of evidence? Exclusionary rules in the 
Swiss CPC are of particular relevance to this question, since, currently, the 
code sets strict exclusionary rules and also establishes a 'fruit of the poisonous 
tree' doctrine intended to exclude tainted evidence (Fernwirkungsverbot). Such 
provisions are more typical for adversarial proceedings, not for the inquisito-
rial criminal procedure found in the Swiss system.5 According to our hypoth-
esis, this will trigger problems in the application of these rules. 
Against this background, the following questions will be discussed: How 
do law enforcement authorities, judges, and other competent organs react to 
these rigid rules? Will 'water find its way'? Put differently: Will the strict rules 
be applied in all situations, following the letter of the law, or will practition-
ers find a way around these rules? Will law enforcement authorities adapt these 
rules in practice in such a way that they eventually-and without legislative 
amendments-allow for more discretion? 
In this paper, we will first clarify the legal framework and implications of 
exclusionary rules in the Swiss criminal justice system and consider the ra-
tionale behind the Swiss conception of exclusionary rules. Subsequently, we 
between the publication and the adoption date is due to peculiarities of Swiss legislation. 
3. Delmas-Marty & Spencer 2002, p. 602 f. 
4. Thaman 2013. 
5. Art. 6 CPC; Riedo & Fiolka 2011, no. 1 ff. 
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will present the concrete rules on the exclusion of evidence in Switzerland, fo-
cusing on whether the rules of the CPC adopted three years ago are tobe in-
terpreted strictly or whether they provide discretion to the judges. After this rather 
theoretical approach, we will examine some case law on the application of 
these rules and analyse how exercising discretion has affected the development 
of exclusionary rules. In other words, does the 'water' of discretion find its 
way around the rigid rules of the CPC? 
2 Terms and Rationale behind the Concept of 
Exdusionary Rules in Swiss Law 
Before turning to the concept of exclusionary rules under Swiss law, it is 
important to clarify some commonlyused terms that may have different mean-
ings in other legal systems. Not only the terminology but also the rationale be-
hind the concept of exclusionary rules in Swiss law greatly impact on the 
application of such rules, thus the following definitions are provided. 
'Discretion; as defined by Swiss law and used in the Swiss CPC, refers to 
the competence of a given authority to decide a question that the legislature de-
liberately left open. It is thus left to the respective competent authority to 
choose between different legal consequence or to decide whether there should 
be any legal consequences at all. 6 With regard to exclusionary rules, 'discre-
tion' thus means that it is for the court to decide whether the violation of legal 
norms in obtaining evidence calls for any procedural sanctions, such as the 
exclusion of evidence from the case file, or whether such action is without con-
sequence in the respective criminal proceeding. 
'Exc1usionary rules; primarily defined in Swiss law by Articles 140 and 141 
CPC, deal with the use of unlawfully gathered evidence in criminal proceed-
ings. While certain exclusionary rules, such as Article 141 (1) CPC, leave no 
roomforthediscretionofjudges, others, suchasArticle 141 (2) CPC, provide 
courts with some degree of discretion.7 
The rationale behind the concept of exclusionary rules in Swiss law refers 
to basic standards of human rights. The collection and subsequent use of il-
legally gathered evidence may amount to a violation of the right to a fair trial, 
according to the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, which in turn refers to the ju-
6. Häfelin, Müller & Uhlmann 2010, p. 99. 
7. For example, see Pieth 2012, p. 166-169. 
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risprudence of the ECtHR.8 The right to have certain evidence excluded from 
the case file can thus be seen as a component of defence rights, like the privi-
lege against self-incrimination, or as a manifestation of the presumption of 
innocence.9 In its older case law, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court further 
stated that evidence gathered in violation of the suspect's right to privacy or right 
against self-incrimination must be excluded, as this would perpetuate in-
fringement of the suspect's human rights.10 However, these rights are not ab-
solute and can be limited as long as the proceedings as a whole remain fair.J l 
Accordingly, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court allows for a balancing of inter-
ests when deciding on the admissibility of evidence, which is reflected by Ar-
ticle 141 (2) CPC.12 This sums up the balancing approach, an approach that 
is generally foreign to criminal law yet typical in human rights law, as well as 
demonstrating how discretion plays an important role in the court's search for 
justice. 
In addition to the protection of the individual, exclusionary rules also pro-
tect the fact finding process itself, which amounts to a public interest. This is 
based on the insight that evidence gathered through torture, coercion, or sim-
ilar methods frequently fails to reflect the actual truth, but rather depicts how 
the witness or suspect evaded pressure.13 Accordingly, such unreliable evidence 
should not be used to convict the accused. This is most prominently reflected 
in Article 141 ( 1) CPC. Finally, and in contrast to other inquisitorial systems, 
Swiss doctrine acknowledges exclusionary rules as a form of procedural sanc-
tions. 'Procedural sanctions,' as defined by Swiss law and referred to in Swiss 
criminal procedure law, are a means to impose legal consequences on prose-
cution authorities who engage in unlawful conduct during criminal proceed-
ings. Hence, their aim is to prevent future human rights violations.14 
8. ECtHR 12 July 1988, Schenk v. Switzerland, A 140, para. 45 ff.; ECtHR 12 May 2000, 
Khan v. United Kingdom, Reports 2000-V, para. 34 ff.; ECtHR 25 September 2001, .P.G. and 
J.H. v. United Kingdom, Reports 2001-IX, para. 76 ff.; BGE 129 I 85/ lP.396/2002 of 13 
November 2002, E. 4.1, p. 88 <http://www.bger.ch>; BGE 131 I 272/ lP. 570/2004 of 3 May 
2004, E. 3.2.1, p. 274 <http://www.bger.ch>. 
9. BGE 130 I 126/ lP.635/2003 of 18 May 2004, E. 2.1, p. 129; BGE 131 I 272/ lP. 570/ 
2004 of 3 May 2004, E. 3.2.3.2., p. 276 <http://www.bger.ch>. 
10. BGE 120 Ia 314, p. 318 <http://www.bger.ch>. 
11. ECtHR Schenk v. Switzerland, para. 46. 
12. BGE 131 I 272/ lP. 570/2004 of 3 May 2004, E. 4.1.2, p. 278 f.; BGE 130 I 126/ 
lP.635/2003 of 18 May 2004, E. 3.2, p. 132 <http://www.bger.ch>. 
13. Ruckstuhl 2006, p. 20. 
14. Fornito 2000, p. 57; Gless 2011, no. 27; Godenzi 2011, p. 322, 336; Dencker 1977, 
p. 52. 
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The allusion to procedural sanctions may at first glance be surprising since 
Swiss criminal procedure is of a primarily inquisitorial character, with finding 
the material truth as one of the main goals of criminal procedure.15 This goal 
is also reflected inArticle 6 (2) CPC, which places an obligation on the prose-
cution to gather exculpatory evidence as well as incriminating. Thus, the idea 
of sanctioning one side for misconduct in the gathering of evidence, a practice 
which derives from the adversarial system of the United States, raises the ques-
tion of whether it can be adapted to an inquisitorial criminal system at all. This 
question has been a subject of controversial debate in various countries. 
One position-mainly held in Germany, which also has an inquisitorial 
criminal procedure system-basically rejects the idea of disciplining prosecu-
tion authorities as they are not party to the criminal proceeding, unlike in ad-
versarial traditions such as those of the United States. Accordingly, it is considered 
sufficient to sanction an official's unlawful conduct in disciplinary proceed-
ings (Disziplinarverfahren) or criminal proceedings. However, to let a poten-
tially guilty suspect walk free, in the worst case scenario, because of facts that 
cannot be disclosed due to the wrongdoing of an official not party to the pro-
ceedings is generally considered incompatible with the inquisitorial system of 
criminal procedure.16 Such reasoning, however, rests on the presumption that 
tainted evidence may be reliable-a flawed presumption in cases of duress or 
actual torture, for instance. 
The other position, which is the majority view in Swiss doctrine, acknowl-
edges that, in principle, exclusionary rules have a secondary effect as an in-
strument to discipline the prosecution authorities.17 lt is common knowledge 
that the prosecution authorities' compliance with procedural rules is more 
likely if they know that evidence could potentially be excluded in later pro-
ceedings if they act in violation of these standards.18 This idea is reflected in older 
case law where, for example, the Supreme Court of the Canton of Berne stated 
that an illegally recorded tape was inadmissible and that the actions of the 
prosecution authorities was to be strongly condemned, lest undue methods 
become a habit.19 However, according to Fornito, this approach gives primacy 
15. Art. 6 CPC; Riedo & Fiolka 2011, no. 1 ff. 
16. For an overview, see Dencker 1977, p. 52 f.; Fornito 2000, p. 59. 
17. Gless 2011, no. 6; Höhener & Vest 2009, p. 104; Eicker & Vest 2005, p. 891; Al-
brecht 2007, no. 34 to Art. 23 BetmG, p. 186. 
18. Fornito 2000, p. 59. 
19. Straf- und Anklagekammern des bernischen Obergerichts, judgment of 21 Febru-
ary 1949, ZBJV 82 (1952), p. 86; for similar present-day arguments, see Höhener & Vest 2009, 
p. 104. 
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to the preventive character of exclusionary rules over the actual sanctioning of 
the prosecution, although it is indeed named for the latter.20 
According to the Swiss understanding, which champions a partly disci-
plinary approach, not every rule on the exclusion of evidence is a procedural 
sanction, only those that try to remove any incentive for prosecutors to over-
step the limits of legality. One example is the exclusionary rule sanctioning 
situations where obligatory court authorisation has not been requested or 
provided, such as in instances of telephone surveillance, since the purpose 
of such authorisation is to limit excessive use of this enforcement measure. 
Since evidence gathered without court authorisation could be declared in-
admissible, the prosecution has no incentive to violate these rules and will 
instead abide by them.21 However, some other rules on the exclusion of evi-
dence pursue other goals, such as the protection of family life through the 
right to refuse to give testimony, and are not considered to be procedural 
sanctions. 
In sum, procedural sanctions, as explained by scholars in the context of the 
Swiss criminal justice system, are not primarily intended to be of a penalising 
nature but rather a preventive one. In light of this, procedural sanctions do 
not interfere with the otherwise inquisitorial character of the Swiss criminal pro-
cedure system, but instead safeguard the rule of law. However, it is important 
to point out that exclusionary rules have always been a controversial topic in 
Switzerland,22 as in other jurisdictions. The somewhat paradoxical consequence 
of exclusionary rules and the ensuing dilemmas have been famously described 
by American lawyer Wigmore: 'Our way of upholding the Constitution is not 
to strike at the man who breaks it but to let off somebody else who breaks 
something else:23 
3 Exdusionary Rules-The Legal Framework 
Having elaborated on the rationale of exclusionary rules as described by Swiss 
courts and scholars, we now turn to the exclusionary rules as laid down in the 
Swiss CPC. A blanket rule for exclusionary rules is found in Article 141; the 
20. Fornito 2000, p. 59; Gless 2011, no. 27. 
21. See Fornito 2000, p. 59; with references to Müller & Schefer 2008, p. 1001; Joset & 
Ruckstuhl 1993, p. 355 ff. ( criticising the former practice of paying 'success' fees to under-
cover agents). 
22. For instance, see Fornito 2000, p. 38-68. 
23. Wigmore 1904, Section 2184, no. 35. 
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legislature intended to explicitly regulate the exclusion of certain types of evi-
dence and thereby to limit the discretion formerly held by judges in this regard. 
3.1 Relevant Statutes-General Legal Framework 
The core provision governing the gathering of evidence through prohibited 
methods, Article 140 CPC, reads as follows: 
( 1) The use of coercion, violence, threats, promises, deception and methods 
that may compromise the ability of the person concerned to think or de-
cide freely are prohibited when taking evidence. 
(2) Such methods remain unlawful even ifthe person concerned consents to 
their use. 
The relevant provision regarding exclusionary rules, Article 141 CPC, is en-
titled 'Admissibility of unlawfully obtained evidence; but it operates by stipu-
lating conditions of inadmissibility: 
(1) Evidence obtained in violation of Article 140 is not admissible under any 
circumstances. The foregoing also applies where this Code declares evi-
dence to be inadrnissible. 
(2) Evidence that crirninal justice authorities have obtained by crirninal meth-
ods or by violating regulations on admissibility is inadmissible unless it is 
essential that it be admitted in order to secure a conviction for a serious 
offence. 
(3) Evidence that has been obtained in violation of mere administrative reg-
ulations is admissible by legislative dictum, see Article 141 para 3 CPC. 
(4) Where evidence that is inadmissible under paragraph 2 has made it pos-
sible to obtain additional evidence, such evidence is not admissible if it 
would have been impossible to obtain had the previous evidence not been 
obtained. 
(5) Records relating to inadrnissible evidence shall be removed from the case 
documents, held in safekeeping until a final judgment has concluded the 
proceedings, and then destroyed. 
In the following, we will focus on paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 of Article 141 CPC, 
as they contain a strict and, at the same time, relative approach to the exclusion 
of evidence. While discussing paragraph 1, we will also consider Article 289 ( 6) 
CPC, which is another explicit provision on non-admissibility contained in the 
CPC, which governs the authorisation procedure for undercover investigations. 
According to Article 289 ( 6) CPC, the deployment of an undercover inves-
tigator requires authorisation of the compulsory measures court (Zwangs-
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massnahmegericht). If authorisation is not granted, the public prosecutor must 
end the deployment immediately and destroy all records. No findings made 
during such an action may be used.24 As discussed later, this provision has, 
nevertheless, been implemented in a different manner than what the wording 
suggests. 
3.2 Identifying Relevant Situations and Procedural 
Sanctions 
Reading through the provisions of the CPC, one gets the impression that the 
legislature was eager to carefully regulate the exclusion of evidence. At first 
glance, therefore, it may appear difficult to answer the overarching question 
of this paper: 'What role does discretion play when it comes to the question of 
exclusion of evidence in an inquisitorial criminal law system?' 
Does-or rather, when does-Swiss law provide the competent authorities 
with discretion, and when does it allow for the procedural sanction of exclusion 
of evidence? In considering this question and looking for examples where dis-
cretion is granted, one must keep in mind the challenge of explaining the ftmc-
tion and implications of procedural sanctions in an inquisitorial system, especially 
with the preventive character that Swiss law attaches to them. We will see that 
the rules laid down in the CPC have special features that introduce strict ex-
clusionary rules and the so-called 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine (Fern-
wirkungsverbot)-both typical features of adversarial proceedings, not of an 
inquisitorial system like in Switzerland. As we initially hypothesised, we will see 
if this triggers problems in the application of these rules in practice. 
3.2.1 No Discretion Provided-Artide 141 (1) CPC 
By reading the Swiss law, we can conclude that there is no discretion granted 
in situations governed by Article 141 ( 1) CPC: When evidence is obtained in 
a manner that the CPC itself declares to be inadmissible, a decision to use the 
evidence is not subject to discretion. Such a prohibition applies when explic-
itly banned methods of evidence gathering are used, namely with the 'use of 
coercion, violence, threats, promises, deception and methods that may com-
promise the ability of the person concerned to think or decide freely.'25 
Another setting in which Article 141 (1) applies is regulated by Article 289 
( 6) CPC. According to this provision, mentioned earlier, records stemming 
24. Art. 289 ( 6) CPC in fine. 
25. Art. 140 (1) CPC; for further information, see: Pieth 2012 p. 167. 
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from an undercover investigation carried out without proper authorisation 
must be destroyed. Findings from an unauthorised undercover investigation may 
not be used. Hence, the legislature has adopted a clear rule: The authorities can-
not take advantage of information gained by improper undercover investiga-
tions and no discretion is granted. By declaring any evidence acquired in this 
manner inadmissible, this absolute exclusionary rule aims to prevent the gravest 
kinds of misconduct by the prosecution authorities, such as torture, coercion, 
and serious infringements of the right to privacy, as well as utter defiance of 
legal orders. lt can thus be qualified as a procedural sanction. 
3.2.2 Some Discretion Provided-Article 141 (2) CPC 
Discretion may be granted where authorities obtain evidence in a way that 
violates certain rules on admissibility, but not in a way referenced by an ex-
plicit exclusionary rule. These are situations that arise under Article 141 (2) 
CPC. Indeed, the legislature might have had such situations in mind when 
phrasing the title of Article 141 CPC: 'Admissibility of unlawfully obtained 
evidence.' Whereas the wording of the provision might initially suggest the 
admissibility of all evidence gained in violation of the legal requirements, 
such an assumption is incorrect. 
The rule practitioners and courts are left with does indeed allow for the ad-
mission of unlawfully obtained evidence, but only in certain cases; the excep-
tions to inadmissibility are stated in strong words and only take effect to help 
establish the truth in criminal trials for grave breaches of law. This becomes clear 
when reading the authentic German version of Article 141 (2) CPC, not the of-
ficially provided, but non-authentic, English translation: 'Beweise, die Straf-
behörden in strafbarer Weise oder unter Verletzung von Gültigkeitsvorschriften 
erhoben haben, dürfen nicht verwertet werden, es sei denn, ihre Verwertung sei zur 
Aufklärung schwerer Straftaten unerlässlich.' 
The English version, provided by the Swiss government, reads: 
Evidence that criminal justice authorities have obtained by criminal meth-
ods or by violating regulations on admissibility is inadmissible unless 
it is essential that it be admitted in order to secure a conviction for a 
serious offence.26 
However, it ought to be translated as: 
26. English translation available at <http://www.admin.ch/ opc/ en/ classified-compilation/ 
20052319/index.html> (last visited 8 Sept. 2014). 
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Evidence obtained by the criminal justice authorities in a criminal 
manner or in violation of rules protecting the validity of the evidence 
shall not be admitted unless its use is essential to solving serious crimi-
nal offences.27 
169 
From this translation, it follows that the legislature intended to provide 
some discretion to the competent authorities in cases where the admissibility 
of evidence is essential to securing the public interest in a complete clarifica-
tion of facts and, if possible, to proving the guilt of an offender. If, however, 
other interests prevail, such as the interests of the defence where the defen-
dant's rights were curtailed disproportionately, the evidence must be excluded.28 
Accordingly, Article 141 (2) CPC gives some discretion to the judges. 
3.2.3 Leeway in Decision-Making, but No Discretion-Article 
141 (4) CPC 
With regard to discretion, a rather vague situation arises under Article 141 
(4) CPC, which sets out the so-called 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine 
(Fernwirkungsverbot). According to this doctrine, evidence stemming from 
unlawfully obtained evidence is also inadmissible, 'if it would have been im-
possible to obtain had the previous evidence not been obtained.' Following up 
on previous case law, the Swiss courts have stated that an exception to the 'fruit 
of the poisonous tree' doctrine arises when the secondary evidence could have 
been obtained without the primary evidence.29 
Still, the exact meaning of this principle remains unclear. Do the courts 
grant themselves the discretion to decide whether it would have been possible 
to obtain the secondary evidence without the illegally obtained evidence? Read-
ing the statute and the legislative material, it is clear that the legislature did 
not intend to grant the courts the power to balance competing interests and de-
cide accordingly. Rather, the intention was to clarify the following scenario: 
The courts shall determine whether, in a certain situation, the investigating 
authorities might have obtained the (tainted) piece of evidence by way of an 
unobstructed path. If so, the legislature would want the evidence to be ad-
mitted. This curious caveat raises a number of interesting questions with re-
27. Emphasis added by the authors; for the translation provided by Summers for Art. 
141 CPC, see Donatsch, Hansjakob & Lieber 2010, p. 607. 
28. Gless 2011, nos. 78-84; Pieth 2012, p. 169. 
29. See BGE 138 IV 169/ 6B_805/2011 of 12 July 2012, E. 3.3.2, with further references 
<http://www.bger.ch>; Gless 2010, 159. 
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gard to procedural sanctions, yet they are unrelated to discretion; Article 141 
( 4) CPC merely gives the courts some room to decide a factual question. 
As in situations governed by Article 141 (1) CPC, the law is not entirely 
clear with regard to which exclusionary rules entail a Fernwirkungsverbot, be-
cause Article 141 (4) CPC merely stipulates: 
Where evidence that is inadmissible under paragraph 2 has made it 
possible to obtain additional evidence, such evidence is not admissi-
ble if it would have been impossible to obtain had the previous evi-
dence not been obtained.30 
Inadmissibility under Article 141 (2) CPC however is the weaker provision 
when compared to inadmissibility under Article 141 ( 1) CPC. The latter pro-
hibits the use of coercion, violence, threats, promises, deception, and other 
forms of duress. 
Although the law does not explicitly state what happens with evidence ob-
tained through another form of evidence that is inadmissible because prohib-
ited methods were used, it is undisputed in doctrine that inadmissible evidence 
according to Article 141 (1) CPC may lead to a Fernwirkungsverbot in some 
form. However, whether this should be absolute or include the caveat explained 
above (probability of obtaining the secondary evidence without the primary tainted 
evidence) is subject to debate. The argument for an absolute Fernwirkungsverbot 
relies on the lawmaking process: Originally, Article 141 (4) CPC was drafted 
to include the situations of paragraph 1 and 2. lt is reasoned that, since the 
legislature excluded paragraph 1 situations from the relative Fernwirkungsver-
bot of paragraph 4, it must entail an absolute Fernwirkungsverbot.31 The other 
side accepts that the wording and drafting history of Article 141 ( 4) CPC sug-
gest an absolute Fernwirkungsverbot for paragraph 1 situations, but argues that 
this interpretation would lead to unacceptable results. They opine that letting 
a guilty person walk free, even when incriminating evidence exists that would 
have been discovered anyway, contradicts the fundamental sense of justice. Ac-
cordingly, situations described in paragraph 1 should trigger a relative Fern-
wirkungsverbot as well.32 To date, the Swiss Federal Court has explicitly left this 
question open.33 
30. Emphasis added. 
31. Häring 2009, p. 250-251; Sollberger 2008, p. 126; Gless, 2011, no. 90. 
32. Benedict & Treccani, no. 39; Vetterli 2012, p. 466. 
33. BGE 138 N 169/ 6B_805/2011 of 12 July 2012, E. 3.2. <http://www.bger.ch>. 
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3.3 Exclusionary Rules in Swiss Criminal Law-Interim 
Conclusion 
The CPC establishes a strict legal framework regarding the exclusion of ev-
idence. While there are some situations where the legislature did not provide 
the courts with any discretionary power (Article 141 ( 1) CPC), the law allows 
for a balancing approach in others (Article 141 (2) CPC). Consequently, there 
are some cases where discretion is explicitly granted to the courts regarding 
the exclusion of evidence. 
In contrast, the law leaves no room for discretion with regard to the ques-
tion of a Fernwirkungsverbot of illegally gathered evidence. Whether the sec-
ondary evidence could have been obtained independently from the primary, 
illegally obtained evidence is a factual question, and does not entail the use of 
discretion. 
Exclusionary rules on evidence pursue different goals. In Swiss doctrine, 
they are seen as procedural sanctions to punish unlawful conduct by the pros-
ecution authorities, among other goals. However, this disciplinary element is 
mainly based on preventive arguments, in order to preclude future miscon-
duct by prosecution authorities and thus violations of the basic rights of sus-
pects. The prosecution is not seen as a party to the proceedings that suffers a 
disadvantage, but exclusion of evidence is seen as removing any incentive for 
prosecution authorities to overstep the limits of legality. By viewing proce-
dural sanctions in this way, it seems possible to reconcile them with the in-
quisitorial character of the Swiss criminal procedure system. 
4 Water Always Finds Its Way? Recent Case Law 
and Legal Reform 
Is it feasible to have a regime of strict exclusionary rules, or are exclusion-
ary rules something that 'water' always finds its way around? Looking at re-
cent case law and legal reforms, our hypothesis is that when the law does not 
leave enough room for discretion in sensitive issues, judges will circumvent 
the rigid rules and reintroduce discretion. 
4. 1 Undercover Investigations v. Enquiries-The 
Emergence of a New Instrument 
One colourful example of the complex problems associated with a strict 
regulation approach and its fragility are undercover activities. As demonstrated 
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above in the example of Article 289 ( 6) CPC, the Swiss legislature has taken a 
very strict approach to the admissibility of information gathered during an 
unauthorised undercover investigation-knowing that the matter is highly 
controversial. 
4.1.1 The Case Law'Pulls a Trigger' 
Case law on the matter of exclusionary rules has given rise to controversial 
debate. In analysing some of these decisions, we will keep in mind the ques-
tion laid down at the beginning of this paper: Do courts exercise discretion 
even where there would be none according to the strict wording of the relevant 
provisions? Did the courts create room for discretion, and, if so, how? 
Even before the adoption of the CPC, controversial debate about the modal-· 
ities of exclusionary rules took place, triggered by a case involving a police of-
ficer who used the internet to contact possible paedophiles:34 
On 17 August 2005, X, using the pseudonym 'Jerome', contacted a person 
called 'Manuela_l3' in the Bluewin chat room 'kidstalk'. During the chat, the 
26-year-old X confronted 'Manuela_l 3' with various comments, questions and 
demands of a sexual nature. After about one hour of chatting, he proposed to 
go to Zurich for a meeting with 'Manuela_l3', to pet her genitals and to 'do it 
all'. They arranged to meet the next day at 11 a.m. at the Zurich main station. 
X showed up at the arranged meeting point. However, he did not meet a 13-
year-old girl but policemen, who had used the pseudonym 'Manuela_l3' to 
investigate paedo-sexual criminals. During a search of X's home residence, 
they also found child pornography on X's computer. As a result, the police 
opened an investigation against X on charges of alleged child molestation and 
child pornography. 
Even before the adoption of the CPC, formal undercover investigations were 
strictly governed by specific law (including an exclusionary rule for unautho-
rised action),35 whereas police enquiries did not exist as a tool for investigation,36 
but were still practiced in some cantons in the absence of appropriate rules. 
Naturally it was-and still is-difficult to draw the line between formal in-
vestigations and mere internet patrol by the police. This line, however, is cru-
cial in order to decide whether an exclusionary rule applies or not, as the 
consequences that arise depend on which side of the line an action falls. 
34. BGE 134 IV 266/ 6B_777/2007 of 16 June 2008 <http://www.bger.ch>. 
35. Bundesgesetz über die verdeckte Ermittlung (BVE) [Federal Law on Undercover In-
vestigation J, <http://www.admin.ch/opc/de/federal -gazette/2003/4465.pdf> (last visited 8 
Sept. 2014). 
36. But the legislature provided such basis in December 2012. 
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Thus, even though doctrine and case law rendered evidence gathered through 
an unauthorised undercover investigation inadrnissible, an alternative opened 
to let water flow freely.37 Since the boundary between unauthorised under-
cover investigations and mere 'police undercover enquiries' were vague, law 
enforcement agencies had an incentive to use the latter tool to investigate, or, 
rather, pre-investigate, an alleged crime. Evidence gained from such enquiries 
was inadmissible, unless one could argue that a mere undercover enquiry did 
not fall within the ambit of the strict rules for undercover investigations, and 
thus did not trigger an exclusionary rule. Therefore, those who wanted to keep 
the gate open to gain information, allowing evidence gathering by the police 
without triggering an exclusionary rule, argued for limited application of the 
strict rules. Ignoring the intent of the legislature and using the lack of an ex-
plicit definition of an undercover investigation (as distinct from an undercover 
police enquiry), they argued that the rigor of the rules governing undercover 
investigations was a compelling reason to have a high threshold for defining a 
formal undercover investigation. For instance, one suggestion was that only 
the establishment of a 'legend' for an undercover agent (such as a false pass-
port) was seen a sufficient indicator of an undercover investigation.38 All meas-
ures falling short of such a threshold, as the argument went, are mere police 
enquiries-no rules apply and there would be no exclusion of the informa-
tion gathered. 
Following this line of argumentation, any investigation would simply have 
tobe classified as an 'enquiry' to avoid the strict rules on inadmissibility of ev-
idence associated with undercover investigations, thus opening up a loophole 
for the investigating authorities when making contacts with suspects. 
In the case described above, the investigating authorities thus argued that 
their actions did not have to be authorised by a court because it was an undercover 
enquiry rather than an undercover investigation governed by strict rules. The 
Swiss Supreme Court, however, did not adopt this line of reasoning. In a well-
known decision, BGE 134 IV 266, which was handed down before the adop-
tion of the CPC but in application of well-established principles that were the 
same as those laid down in current CPC, the Court boldly stated that any ac-
tion where a policeman, who is not recognisable as such, initiated contact with 
37. Art. 18 (5) Bundesgesetz über die verdeckte Ermittlung (BVE), supra. note 35. 
38. Parlamentarische Initiative, Präzisierung des Anwendungsbereichs der Bestim-
mungen über die verdeckte Ermittlung, Bericht der Kommission für Rechtsfragen des Na-
tionalrates vom 3 February 2012 [Parliamentary initiative, specifying the scope of application 
of the Covert Investigations Act, Review of the National Council Legal Affairs Committee 
3 February 2013], < http://www.admin.ch/opc/de/federal-gazette/2012/5609.pdf>, p. 5612. 
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a suspect must be qualified as an undercover investigation, requiring court au-
thorisation in order to produce valid evidence.39 With this leading case, the 
Supreme Court thus closed the loophole undermining the protection of ac-
cused persons by declaring evidence obtained through unauthorised chat con-
versations, and thus the pornography found at X's house found during the 
search, to be inadmissible.40 
4.1.2 The Situation after the Adoption of the CPC 
The controversial debate around the matter of exclusionary rules, however, 
did not stop after this decision, nor did it stop after the adoption of the CPC 
with its general and strict exclusionary rules. In fact, the enactment of new rules 
gave rise to renewed demands for discretion, as the following decision shows: 
X, a police official, was suspected of embezzling finds of valuables. To ver-
ify the suspicion, an undercover policeman handed a bag to X while he was in 
charge of lost & found at the police station. The bag contained, amongst other 
things, 150 Swiss Francs. The bag had allegedly been found by some tourists. 
As X was filling out the standard form, she did not account for the 150 Swiss 
Francs. Later, her superiors confronted X with these facts. Thereafter, X con-
fessed and pleaded guilty to embezzling the 150 Swiss Francs, as well as of an-
other 550 Swiss Francs, which she had previously taken. During the trial, the 
question arose whether X's confession was tainted and thus inadmissible.41 
When the Supreme Court handed down its judgment on 23 August 2011,42 
the CPC had only been in force for nine months. Although its rules appeared 
tobe quite similar to the previous law,43 it was at first unclear which police ac-
tions fell under the scope of 'undercover investigations' strictly regulated by 
Arts. 285-298 CPC and which could be considered mere police enquiries for 
which no court or other authorisation was necessary. Again, the Swiss Supreme 
Court had to decide whether a gate should be opened, one allowing for unau-
thorised police action beyond the rules of the CPC. 
The court resisted the temptation to reintroduce room for discretion, but 
notably specified its earlier case law when clarifying that undercover investigations 
are established with the criterion of 'making contact with the suspect,' which 
requires a specific action by the undercover agent that must somehow be con-
nected to the offence committed. In the case concerning the dishonest police-
39. BGE 134 IV 266/ 6B_777/2007 of 16 June 2008, E. 3.5-3.7 <http://www.bger.ch>. 
40. BGE 134 IV 266/ 6B_777/2007 of 16 June 2008 <http://www.bger.ch>. 
41. BGer 6B_l41/2011 <http://www.bger.ch>. 
42. BGer 6B_l41/2011 <http://www.bger.ch>. 
43. See supra note 35. 
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woman, the Swiss Supreme Court held that this criterion was not fulfilled. lt 
followed that any evidence obtained through this intervention was admissible 
because it did not amount to a formal undercover investigation and therefore 
did not have to fulfil its rather strict requirements.44 
In both cases, the law on its face did not leave any room for discretion to 
the Court. The Court, however, could have disregarded the wording of the 
black letter law by introducing a new category of 'undercover enquiry' and 
thus made room for discretion, yet the Swiss Supreme Court did not intro-
duce any way around the strict law. Still, what are the consequences flowing 
from this law-abiding approach of the Supreme Court? 
4.1.3 The Pressure to Change the Law 
The above case law was not well received by the Swiss public. Therefore, in 
2008, following the Swiss Supreme Court's case concerning the investigation 
of the alleged paedophile,45 a parliamentary initiative was submitted, request-
ing a definition and differentiation of the concepts of 'undercover investiga-
tion' and 'undercover enquiries' and the introduction of a legal option to use 
evidence resulting from the latter.46 In implementing this initiative, Articles 
285a and 298a CPC were adopted, which define both 'undercover investiga-
tion' and 'undercover enquiries': 
Article 285a CPC: In an undercover investigation,47 police officers or 
persons temporarily appointed to carry out police duties make con-
tact with persons under false pretences by using a false identity ( cover) 
supported by documents with the aim of gaining the trust of those 
persons and infiltrating a criminal environment in order to investi-
gate particularly serious offences. 
Article 298a CPC: (1) In undercover enquiries,48 police officers de-
ployed for short periods in such a way that their true identity and 
function remains concealed attempt to investigate felonies and mis-
demeanours and to do so enter into or pretend that they wish to enter 
into fictitious transactions. 
44. BGer 6B_141/2011, E. 2.3 and 2.4 <http://www.bger.ch>. 
45. BGE 134 N 266/ 6B_777/2007 of 16 June 2008 <http://www.bger.ch>. 
46. Parlamentarische Initiative, Präzisierung des Anwendungsbereichs der Bestim-
mungen über die verdeckte Ermittlung, Bericht der Kommission für Rechtsfragen des Na-
tionalrates vom 3 February 2012, supra note 38, p. 5610 ff. 
47. Emphasis added. 
48. Emphasis added. 
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(2) Undercover agents are provided with a cover within the meaning 
of Article 285a. Their true identity and function is disclosed in the 
case files and at hearings. 
This amendment to the Swiss Criminal Procedure Code entered into force on 
1 May 2013, 49 reintroducing discretion for the Swiss police. Hence, if water 
does not find its way through jurisprudence, it may well find its way through 
politics. 
4.2 Fruit of the Poisonous Tree-Not So Deadly 
after All ... 
Another example of the complex problems associated with a strict regula-
tory approach, and of its fragility, is the recently adopted 'fruit of the poison-
ous tree' doctrine in Swiss law, as laid out in Article 141 ( 4) CPC. The legislature 
did not intend to give discretion to judges in this matter; instead they sought 
a strict rule, but with allowance for evidence that could have been obtained 
independently from the tainted evidence in question. The test applied on the 
basis of Article 141 (4) CPC is this: Would it have been possible to obtain the 
secondary evidence without the primary, illegally obtained evidence? This pro-
viso, however, runs the risk of opening a gate for discretion, water to run 
around the strict law, as shown in the following decisions: 
In the first case, X was suspected ofbeing a drug dealer, selling 500 g of co-
caine to A and B. The police suspected A of also being involved in drug deal-
ing and therefore ordered legal surveillance (tapping) ofher telephone. In the 
course of this surveillance, they also recorded calls between A and X., thus re-
alising that X was high-ranking drug dealer. Upon the arrest of X, the police 
found about 250 g of cocaine at her home. After being confronted with the 
witness statement of A, she pleaded guilty to various drug offences. Before the 
court, however, X claimed that any evidence against her was inadmissible be-
cause the telephone surveillance that led to her arrest was only authorised to 
monitor A. She asserted that any accidentally obtained evidence in crimes of 
other persons was unusable. Furthermore, she argued that any ensuing evi-
dence (the drugs found at her home and her confession) were a consequence 
49. See Bundesrat, Press Release, 'Verdeckte Ermittlung und Fahndung klar geregelt 
[Undercover Investigation and Enquiry Clearly Defined]', 15 Feb. 2013, <http:// 
www.ejpd.admin.ch/ content/ ejpd/ de/harne/ dokumentation/mi/ <\h> \d> 2013/2013-03-
151.html>. 
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of her initial arrest based on the telephone surveillance and thus, as 'fruits of 
the poisonous tree', were inadmissible as wen.so 
In this case, it was agreed that the evidence from the telephone surveillance 
as such was inadmissible according to the applicable law. The controversy re-
lated to the so-called 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine (Fernwirkungsver-
bot), on which the Supreme Court had to take a stance for the first time since 
the adoption of the CPC. The Court conceded that, when discussing the ad-
missibility of evidence, there is, on the one hand, an interest in the compliance 
of investigating authorities with the rules on gathering evidence. On the other 
hand, it conceded that there is a public interest in determining the substantive 
truth and punishing guilty persons while clearing innocent ones. It pointed 
out that both interests must be given sufficient weight when discussing the 
'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine. After discussing different stances taken 
by scholars on the doctrine, the Court held that evidence flowing from inad-
rnissible evidence must also be excluded from the case file if the original, in-
valid evidence was a conditio sine qua non for gathering the subsequent evidence.s1 
This leads to a crucial issue: The effect of the test established by the Supreme 
Court hinges on the definition, or rather application, of the sine qua non-
criterion. 
When applying this rule in BGE 133 IV 329, the Court held that because X 
was having regular contact with A and that this would have drawn the atten-
tion of the police to her irrespective of the incriminating phone calls leading 
to the discovery of the drugs. Furthermore, the Court argued that X made her 
guilty plea mainly because of .N.s witness statement and not because of the 
phone recordings. Accordingly, the Court found that the subsequent evidence 
could have been obtained without the primary, illegally obtained evidence, 
and that it was therefore admissible. 
This approach of the Supreme Court must be criticised. To decide whether 
there should be a Fernwirkungsverbot for certain evidence, one has to look 
solely at the concrete circumstances before the investigating authorities con-
tinue their investigation based on unlawfully obtained evidence. It is crucial to 
establish, and stick to, an ex ante perspective when considering whether evi-
dence in a certain situation could have been detected and obtained independ-
ently from illegally obtained evidence. The deciding authority must avoid an 
ex post perspective in order to construct a theoretical option that could have 
possibly led to lawful obtainment of the secondary evidence. The decisive cri-
50. BGB 133 IV 329/ 6B_l70/2007 of9 October 2007 <http://www.bger.ch>. 
51. BGB 133 IV 239/ 6B_170/2007 of 9 October 2007, B. 4.5 <http://www.bger.ch>. 
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terion is whether, in a particular case, there is a practical and likely possibil-
ity that, irrespective of the illegally obtained evidence, the investigating au-
thorities would have discovered the evidence in question.52 
The consequences of such an approach become even more apparent in BGE 
138 IV 169,53 which gave the Supreme Court another chance to define its un-
derstanding of the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine: 
On 26 April 2010, Swiss border control stopped X as he attempted to enter 
the country. The Swiss authorities had received information from the Sloven-
ian police about a suspicion that X was transporting drugs. A thorough search 
of X's car led to the finding of approximately six kilograms of heroin of a pu-
rity grade of eight per cent, which had been hidden in a fire extinguisher. X was 
ultimately sentenced to 39 months imprisonment. The Slovenian information 
concerning X apparently stemmed from unauthorised Slovenian telephone sur-
veillance. X's defence argued that the evidence obtained by Swiss border control 
was inadmissible as a consequence of the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine. 
Again, there was a common understanding that the evidence directly obtained 
through the illegal telephone surveillance by the Slovenian police was inad-
missible. However, it was unclear whether the subsequent evidence obtained 
through the car search, which originated with the illegal telephone surveil-
lance, was admissible or not. The question of the degree of probability that 
the subsequent evidence would have been found was disputed in the case. Re-
lying on the aforementioned formula, Swiss scholars discussed whether, or 
rather what level of, probability of encountering subsequent evidence should 
determine the admissibility of subsequently obtained evidence.54 The Supreme 
Court set the threshold somewhere in between extremes, holding that the sec-
ondary evidence was only independent from the first if there was a hypothet-
ical high probability that the secondary evidence would have been discovered 
without the first. The Court emphasised that the evaluation must be made in 
every single case, effectively giving discretion to the courts.ss In fact, when de-
ciding the border control case (BGE 138 IV 169), the Supreme Court did not 
examine from an ex ante perspective whether evidence in the specific situa-
tion could have been detected and obtained independently from the illegally 
obtained evidence, but balanced the conflicting interests of law enforcement, 
the defendant, and civil liberties.s6 Afterwards, it held that controls at the bor-
52. Gless 2011, no. 97. 
53. BGE 138 IV 169/ 6B_805/2011 of 12 July 2012 <http://www.bger.ch>. 
54. For instance, see Pieth 2012, p. 172; Häring 2009, p. 252. 
55. BGE 138 IV 169/ 6B_805/2011 of 12 July 2012, E. 3.3.2 <http://www.bger.ch>. 
56. BGE 138 IV 169/ 6B_805/2011 of 12 July 2012, E. 3.3.2 <http://www.bger.ch>. 
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ders were-despite the existence of the Sehengen Area-nothing unusual, 
and it was therefore considered highly probable that the discovery of the drugs 
could have occurred without the illegal telephone surveillance. Accordingly, 
the evidence was declared admissible. It did not give any consideration to the 
actual situation regarding the controls at the internal Sehengen border. 
The two above cases illustrate that, although the legislature did not give any 
discretion to the judges when deciding the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' ques-
tion, the Swiss Supreme Court created discretion by introducing a new test, 
vague terms, and the requirement of evaluation on a case-by-case basis. In this 
way, the Supreme Court succeeded in reintroducing :flexibility where it considered 
it necessary, irrespective of the strict set of legal regulations. 
5 Findings 
The development of Swiss case law on the application of exclusionary rules 
suggests that water does indeed 'find its way.' The wording of the rather strictly 
formulated rules on the exclusion of evidence, which were introduced with 
the CPC for the very purpose of regulating fact-finding in criminal proceed-
ings in a more unyielding manner, was not and is still not always respected. In-
stead, courts have found a way around these new rules as soon as they considered 
the regime too rigid for practical needs. 
Furthermore, some of the case law analysed in this paper demonstrates that 
courts-instead of abiding by the new rules-have tended to adhere to es-
tablished doctrine, or even established or invented new terminology, in order 
to follow a path that allows more discretion. This can be seen, for instance, in 
the tests for determining whether invalid evidence is a conditio sine qua non 
for finding subsequent evidence admissible, in a rather peculiar interpretation 
of Article 141 (4) CPC. In some cases, the courts even disregarded the word-
ing of relevant provisions, which they considered too inflexible for different 
situations of evidence gathering. 
Such an approach may appear rather unusual for a jurisdiction with a strong 
civil law tradition and built on Montesquieu's famous dictum that judges are 
'only the mouth that pronounces the words of the law, inanimate beings who 
can moderate neither its force nor its rigor.'57 The case law on exclusionary 
rules, however, rejects the legal heritage of continental Europe and illustrates 
57. Montesquieu, Esprit des Lois (1777), Liv. XI. Chap. VI., p. 327: 'la bauche, qui 
prononce /es paroles de la loi, des etres inanimes, qui n'en peuvent moderer ni la force ni la 
rigueur'. 
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the wish for discretion and the freedom to use procedural sanctions only where 
they are considered necessary by judges in a given case. 
Whether one finds this approach wise likely depends on the general assess-
ment of judicial discretion versus strict statutory rules, which is a classic con-
flict in all legal systems. While civil law traditions tend to strict rules in many 
fields of law, they do allow for wide discretion when confronted with ques-
tions of exclusion of evidence. This likely stems from a commitment to the 
principle of free assessment or evaluation of evidence in criminal proceedings 
(freie richterliche Beweiswürdigung in Strafsachen), which grants discretion to 
judges when weighing different pieces of evidence. Civil law criminal pro-
ceedings, which are presided over and decided by professional judges, are dom-
inated by the ideal of free choice of evidence on the part of a powerful judge, 
prosecutor, or investigator. This, however, entails the risk that judges will form 
a hypothesis that threatens their impartiality when looking at the possible ev-
idence, and will use discretion to narrow the pool of evidence by not bringing 
the proper evidence into the proceedings or broaden it by allowing evidence 
that should have been excluded.58 In contrast, the common law tradition al-
lows parties to add to the pool of evidence in principle, yet the proceedings 
are bound by a set of exclusionary rules that aim to prevent evidence gathered 
against the black letter of the law from being brought before a judge. Accord-
ingly, the court enjoys no discretion when deciding if a piece of evidence is 
admitted in proceedings, which in turn does not allow for the specific inter-
ests of a case to be balanced. 59 
Ultimately, the question of whether exclusionary rules ought to be subject 
to discretion may be one of political opinion and views shaped by tradition. 
For better or worse, Swiss jurisprudence has abided by the strict rules in cer-
tain situations, but it has given priority to a balancing of interests in some in-
dividual cases, opining that the legislature can never truly foresee the colourful 
situational variations that occur in real life. 
Beyond that, the Swiss example suggests that a well-intended, strict rule 
may even trigger an opposing trend and eventually result in a different out-
come if the austere regime cannot stand up against pressures for discretion. 
This may be the lesson learned from the most recent reform of Swiss procedural 
law. The recent amendment to the CPC now explicitly allows for 'undercover 
enquiry' by the police due to a parliamentary initiative that came about due to 
public pressure. This is a prominent example of how public opinion works, 
58. Jackson & Summers 2012, p. 368-369. 
59. Jackson & Summers 2012, p. 367-368. 
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since the formally endorsed legislature originally wanted to provide this com-
petence to judicial bodies only. One could malze the case that when the law 
does not allow for sufficient discretion in a certain situation, water will not 
only find its way but it may well create a flood-one in which a populist ap-
proach waters down the well-intended, strict rules. 
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